jev-mcp for coding loops

# jev-mcp

A local stdio MCP server that gives Cursor, Codex, and other MCP clients typed [TypeSafe Jev](https://docs.typesafe.ai/introduction.md) judgments. Jev returns Choice, Score, and Noul answers; the host agent still edits files and runs commands.

## Tools

| Tool | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `jev_step` | Route the next step and select a prepared call in one request |
| `jev_coding_loop` | Route the next step and decide whether a partner model is needed |
| `jev_tool_route` | Select an exact host-prepared tool call without generating arguments |
| `jev_review` | Assess a proposed patch |
| `jev_verify` | Check claims against supplied evidence |
| `jev_gate` | Combine patch review and claim verification in one upstream call |
| `jev_screen` | Screen untrusted content before the host reads it |
| `jev_rank` | Rank candidates supplied by the host |
| `jev_scope` | Check whether a prepared action is within the approved task/scope |
| `jev_triage` | Classify a failure and select a recovery strategy |
| `jev_risk` | Security-focused risk triage for a proposed patch |
| `jev_evaluate` | Ask custom, atomic typed questions |

Results include typed answers, token usage, and an `action`: `auto`, `review`, or `escalate`. Confidence measures model certainty, not factual truth. Incomplete context never permits `auto`; reduce the input and submit it again for a complete judgment. Questions that receive untrusted text carry a data-boundary instruction, and `jev_screen` adds a deterministic high-signal injection backstop. Those are defense-in-depth: screening is advisory, not a sanitizer or permission to follow external text.

Question packs are MCP resources at `jev://packs/{coding-loop,tool-route,step,review,verify,screen,rank,gate,scope,triage,risk}`. Workflow templates are MC